Policy towards speculative bubbles is examined in a model of a Þnite horizon "greater fool" bubble, with rational agents, asymmetric information and short-sales constraints. This model permits the use of standard tools of comparative dynamics and welfare economics to analyze bubble policies.
Greenspan suggested that " [t] he more interesting question is whether, even if we were to decide we had a bubble and we wanted to let the air out of it, we would be able to do it. ... we have to be very wary of the notion that a small 25 or 50 basis point move could permanently unwind this bubble. Unquestionably, it will do so for a short period of time, but it may then merely set the stage for a further rise that may in fact be highly destabilizing."
As Schlesinger (1999) put it, "if we tried" to burst a bubble "the odds are we would either fail -which would only embolden the partygoers further -or we would have to destroy the dance hall to succeed" (emphasis added). Along the same lines, William White of the Bank for International Settlements suggests that "[e]ach time short rates rise and the bubble continues to expand, ... the market is conÞrmed in its belief in a 'new era' " (Cecchetti et al., 2000, p. 108) .
By a similar logic, if investors are expecting the central bank to move against a bubble, but it does not do so, then this may be taken as an implicit endorsement of asset prices, and so, may drive prices up further. Thus, policy makers may be reluctant to become "arbiter[s] of security speculation or values" (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, p. 290, quoting the Federal Reserve Board) . That is, central bankers may be concerned that, if they adopt a bubble bursting policy rule, then any action -or inaction -will tend to move markets.
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Unfortunately, it has been difficult for economic theory to address these issues, since there have been few theoretical models in which to examine the welfare implications of policies towards bubbles. Standard models of rational bubbles use an inÞnite-horizon framework, where agents hold overpriced assets because they believe 2 In addition, policy makers worry that, in the presence of bubbles, asset prices become fragile, so policy effects are unpredictable. As Mishkin (2007), p. 399-400, explains, "[t] he effect of interest rates on asset-price bubbles is highly uncertain," and raising rates "may cause a bubble to burst more severely ..." Thus "it is heroic to expect the tools of monetary policy to work normally in abnormal conditions." these assets will be overpriced forever in expected value.
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These models, however, violate market participants' intuition that bubbles eventually burst.
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In addition, bubbles generally improve welfare in these models.
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For these reasons, most studies of bubble policy simply assume an exogenous gap between the market price of an asset and its fundamental value (Kent and Lowe, 1997 , Bernanke and Gertler, 1999 , Cecchetti and coauthors, 2000 , 2003 , and Dupor, 2005 . However, since overpricing is exogenous in these models, it is impossible to capture the effects of policy on expectations and overpricing, discussed above.
These models are therefore vulnerable to the Lucas Critique. Also, since the process driving bubbles is never explicitly modeled in these papers, it is impossible to relate the welfare effects of bubble policy to the market failures that generate bubbles.
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This paper therefore analyzes bubble policy using an explicit, fully endogenous model of a bubble. SpeciÞcally, we assume a "greater fool" model of asset price bubbles, where investors hold overpriced assets in hopes of selling them to someone else -a "greater fool" -before asset prices collapse.
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Many recent bubble models have a greater fool ßavor (Harrison and Kreps, 1978 , Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003 , Allen and Gorton, 1993 , Allen and Gale, 2000 , Conlon, 2004 , Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2003 , Doblas-Madrid, 2008 . Also, greater fool models are consistent with evidence that asset price booms put pressure on brokers' loans White, 1993, 1994) and put options (Bates, 1991) , since these suggest that some agents anticipate a crash. In addition, stocks which are expensive to short have lower expected returns (Jones and Lamont, 2002) , which is also consistent with a greater fool dynamic. Finally, Ofek and Richardson (2003) , Temin and Voth (2004) , Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and Dhar and Goetzmann (2005) argue that many traders followed greater fool strategies during the South Sea bubble and the Internet boom.
It is difficult, however, to capture this greater fool dynamic in standard economic models, where all agents are perfectly rational. Fortunately, a major breakthrough in modeling greater-fool bubbles with rational agents was achieved a decade ago by Allen, Morris and Postlewaite (1993) . These authors consider a Þnite horizon model, so any bubbles must eventually burst, consistent with the intuition of market participants.
They then use asymmetric information and short sale constraints to model a "strong bubble," where everyone knows that an asset is overpriced. Agents hold an asset they know is overpriced because, with asymmetric information, no one knows whether anyone else also knows the asset is overpriced. Thus, everyone hopes to sell the asset 7 Kindleberger (2000) , traces an explicit statement of this theory as far back as 1890, when the Chicago Tribune editorialized about "men who bought property at prices they knew perfectly well were Þctitious, but who ... knew that some still greater fool could be depended on to take the property off their hands and leave them with a proÞt" (p. 111; see also Chancellor, 2000, p. 95) .
to someone else, yielding a greater fool bubble.
Unfortunately, the Allen et al. example is too complicated to work with easily.
Recently, Conlon (2004) We therefore analyze asset deßation policies in a simpliÞed greater fool model. Welfare analysis is especially convenient in greater fool models with rational agents since standard tools of welfare economics then apply. In particular, welfare analysis can be based on utility functions which agents themselves maximize. However, while rational bubble models are therefore a natural place to begin, models based on irrationality, such as Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) , are also important topics of future research.
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Our bubble is structured as follows. First, there are several possible states of the world, and agents have incomplete information about which one of these states is the true state. In some states, half the agents are "good sellers," whose asset might be valuable, and half are "buyers." In other states, half are "bad sellers," who know their asset is worthless, and half are buyers. In still other states, all agents are bad sellers.
8 Asymmetric information models, such as the one we consider, are especially well suited to study the instabilities of concern to policy makers, discussed above (Allen et al., 2006) . In addition, actual investors, even if irrational, are smart enough to analyze and reassess their environments, and such reassessments are clearly central to models of bubbles and crashes. Again, asymmetric information models are ideal for capturing such nontrivial investor information processing and reassessments (see, e.g., Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2003, and Doblas-Madrid, 2008) .
As explained in Section 4, the present model can also be reinterpreted to incorporate the overconÞdence assumption of Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) . The fact that a similar framework can treat models with or without such irrationality is important, since it provides economists who prefer rational models, and those who prefer behavioral models, with a common framework in which to analyze bubbles. This is valuable, since it is clearly still too early in the development of this important Þeld to settle deÞnitively on one model to the exclusion of others.
Buyers are willing to buy because they do not know whether sellers are good or bad. In addition, there are nontrivial gains from trade if the seller is good -due to hedging, say -which compensate for the danger of buying from a bad seller. It is therefore rational for these buyers to risk becoming the "greater fools" that bad sellers hope to sell to. That is, bad sellers create a lemons problem, since they cause buyers to trust good sellers less (Akerlof, 1970) , but gains from trade are large enough to at least partially overcome this lemons problem. A strong bubble in the sense of is then a state of the world in which bad sellers hope they are facing these greater-fool buyers, but they are actually just facing other bad sellers.
In the present model, the only policy tool capable of inßuencing asset prices is the release of information. This is because the discount rate is Þxed (at zero), and the elasticity of demand for assets is inÞnite, so agents bid prices up to the certainty equivalent of expected future prices, regardless of supply. Open market operations, for example, would have no effect here, beyond the information revealed about central bank beliefs. We therefore simply represent the central bank's policy as the release of this information, and ignore other aspects of central bank policy.
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We must then specify what the central bank knows. This paper assumes that the 9 As Stefan Ingves (2007) , the governor of the Swedish central bank, explains in the case of Swedish policy, "when we observe long periods of high growth rates in asset prices and debt, growth rates that appear to be unsustainable in the long run, our view is that it is not reasonable to completely ignore" this. "What this view has meant in practice is fairly marginal changes in the timing of our interest rate changes, and substantial public oral and written focus on the issue" (p. 433-34; emphasis added; note also that Sweden's policy is not without its critics: see Mishkin, 2007, p. 397) . Allen et al. (2006) and Gai et al. (2004) also consider models where announcements matter. In addition, if information is important, interest rate policy itself may serve largely as a signal of central bank information. Of course, the announcer in the present paper could be some other government agency, such as the SEC or the Treasury, rather than the central bank.
central bank only believes an asset is overpriced if it really is overpriced. Thus, the central bank is never wrong in believing an asset is overpriced. However, we assume that the central bank only knows an asset is overpriced if some private agents also know this. That is, the central bank is never the only one to know the asset is overpriced.
Within this context, we consider two extreme information structures for the central bank. In the Þrst, the central bank is relatively smart in the sense that it can know an asset is overpriced even if some private agents do not know this. If the central bank then deßates these overpriced assets, we call this a policy of "general deßation of overpriced assets." Note that this is not yet the bursting of an Allen et al. strong bubble, since some agents -buyers, say -may not know the asset is overpriced.
In this case, since the central bank may know more than some buyers, a policy of general deßation of overpriced assets can protect these buyers from bad sellers who know the asset is worthless. This raises the price received by good sellers, who believe the asset may be valuable, and so, reduces the lemons problem.
This extreme case is contrasted to the opposite extreme, i.e., bubble bursting proper. In this case the central bank only knows an asset is overpriced if there is a strong bubble, so all private agents also know the asset is overpriced. That is, the central bank is no better informed about fundamentals than any private agent.
Thus, bubble bursting announcements reveal nothing to private agents about fundamentals. However, the central bank can make information about fundamentals common knowledge. SpeciÞcally, since the central bank only knows an asset is overpriced if everyone else does, the central bank's announcement tells bad sellers that all other agents are also bad sellers.
A policy of bursting bubbles therefore protects these bad sellers from each other.
Thus, in states of the world where the central bank turns out not to announce a bubble, bad sellers become more conÞdent of selling the asset, exacerbating the lemons problem faced by good sellers. This negative effect can outweigh the positive effect of preventing bad sellers from wasting resources in bubble states.
Thus, while bubbles may be a symptom of asymmetric information, which is a bad thing, eliminating this particular symptom may make the underlying problem worse.
Note that the "general deßation" case above may resemble the Cecchetti et al.
view, since the central bank knows relatively more. On the other hand, the "bubble bursting" case may more closely resemble the Bernanke and Gertler view, since the central bank knows very little. Thus, these extreme cases should illuminate the major issues which would also arise in less extreme intermediate cases. However, other cases, such as where the central bank sometimes wrongly believes that an asset is overpriced, are also of interest (see Kai and Conlon, 2008) .
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In addition, this paper focuses only on the microeconomic aspects of bubble policy.
Future work should study endogenous bubbles in a macroeconomic context, to shed light on their role in countercyclical policy (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999 , Bordo and Jeanne, 2002 , Cecchetti and coauthors, 2000 , 2003 .
In the present model, the potential distortion is a misallocation of produced capital -e.g., a stock market boom may encourage excessive investment in anticipation of an IPO. This has, in fact, been a major concern of policy makers. For example, at the ... Banks begin lending for any project, viable or not. Everyone who can pick up a 10 Of course, opinions differ sharply about whether central bank concerns about overpricing are ever justiÞed. However, since bubble bursting policy is one of the most widely discussed issues in central banking, it is clearly important, at least hypothetically, to consider the theoretical issues surrounding this important debate. Of course, it should be noted that, even if central bank announcements do move prices, this may be because they signal future policy intentions, not actual information about assets. hammer becomes a construction worker" (p. 122). Similarly, Swedish central bank governor Stefan Ingves (2007) argues that anti-bubble policy "can dampen the effects of the unmotivated price change on the real economy and thereby prevent an inefficient allocation of resources" (p. 437). Of course, models with other types of distortion would also be an important topic of future research.
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Finally, this paper examines policy in the simplest possible models. For example, we limit our analysis to a three-period world, with a bubble only in period one. This makes the timing of policy very rigid. In particular, "bubble bursting" really means bubble prevention -i.e., prevention of the Þrst-period bubble. Thus, we cannot study the effects of delayed policy actions. While our results should generalize, it is important to determine what other issues also arise in more complicated models.
The next section introduces the basic asset market model. Section 2 studies general deßation of overpriced assets while Section 3 considers bubble bursting proper. Section 4 brießy discusses agent irrationality and Section 5 concludes.
PRELIMINARIES
This section presents the basic asset market model. The framework is similar to Milgrom and Stokey (1982) , and Conlon (2004) .
There are two risk neutral individuals in the market, Ellen and Frank, and a Þnite set of states of the world, Ω. A typical state of the world is ω ∈ Ω. We also use symbols 11 There has been some disagreement as to whether managers increase investment in response to overpriced assets. Blanchard et al. (1993, p. 115) Þnd that overpricing plays "at most a limited role in affecting investment decisions," while Chirinko and Schaller (2001) , Panageas (2003) , and Gilchrist, et al. (2005) Þnd stronger evidence that asset overpricing encourages overinvestment. In Dupor (2005) , like here, anti-bubble policy prevents bubbles from leading to overinvestment, though, since his bubble is exogenous, his model does not capture the lemons effect. See also Bolton, et al. (2005) and MU F (ω) depend only on ω, and not on the wealth obtained from this market.
Thus, the utility function must be at least piecewise linear (see . Let
be shadow state prices indicating the ex ante value that Ellen and Frank attach to a unit of consumption in state ω. We condense sums like
.., ω k ) for short, and similarly for M F (ω 1 , ..., ω k ).
Note that M E (ω) is the Arrow-Debreu price of a dollar in state ω, that would prevail in an economy with representative agent Ellen, and similarly for M F (ω) (Arrow, 1964) . Thus, M E (·) and M F (·) resemble Equivalent Martingale probability measures (Harrison and Kreps, 1979) . This means that Ellen's (Frank's) willingness to pay for an asset is simply given by the asset's conditional expected next-period value, based on the artiÞcial probabilities M E (·) (respectively, M F (·)). See (3) and (4) below.
The market lasts for three periods, denoted t = 1, 2, 3, but there is no discounting.
There is a riskless asset (money), and a risky asset. A unit of the risky asset ultimately, in period 3, pays a single dividend of d(ω) in state ω.
This paper allows the risky asset to be produced. For example, office buildings can be constructed and entrepreneurs can expand their Þrms in anticipation of an IPO.
Thus, in certain states, ω ∈ Ω E , Ellen can produce an amount of the asset, a, at cost c(a), with c(0) = 0. In other states she cannot produce. Similarly, Frank can only produce in states ω ∈ Ω F , also at cost c(a). All production occurs before period t = 1, 
for Ellen, and similarly for Frank. Assume that there are no short sales of the risky asset, so a E t (ω) ≥ 0 and a F t (ω) ≥ 0 for all ω and t.
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Assume that the price of the consumption good, in terms of money, is Þxed at one.
Since marginal utilities are locally constant, the overall expected payoff to Ellen, say, 12 Many models of asset markets assume short-sale constraints (Harrison and Kreps, 1978 , Tirole, 1982 . As Shiller (2000), p. 244, explains, "[w] hen a ridiculous fad develops for some stocks ... most investors ... do no more than avoid those stocks: They do not take the kind of massive short positions ... that would fully offset the overly exuberant prices that the fad investors would create." See also Ofek and Richardson (2003) and Jones and Lamont (2002) who relate short selling costs to asset overpricing. More generally, if short sales are especially difficult in certain markets, e.g., real estate, then bubbles may be more likely in those markets.
Put options may play a role similar to short sales. Asquith et al. (2004) , p. 30, however, argue that "[h]edge fund managers and other practitioners involved in short selling maintain that they can not effectively use the options market. In interviews, they repeatedly claimed that the options market provides less liquidity and is more expensive than the short sales market when trying to establish a large position." based on the value of her portfolio in period 3, is then
where E π is the expectation with respect to the prior π, and similarly for Frank.
The models below have rich information structures. As is common in such models, we represent agents' information using information partitions. 13 A partition of the set Ω is a set of subsets, S i , of Ω, such that the subsets are all disjoint (
if the agent knows which subset, S i , the true state is in, but she cannot distinguish between different elements of S i . For example, if ω 1 is the actual state of the world, and ω 1 ∈ S 3 , say, then the agent knows that the state is in S 3 , but she does not know whether the true state is ω 1 or some other state, ω 2 , say, in S 3 . The subsets, S i , of an information partition are called "cells" or "information sets." These information partitions can represent rich information structures.
14 13 See Milgrom and Stokey (1982) . For expository treatments, see Huang and Litzenberger (1988) , Binmore (1992 ), or Samuelson (2004 .
14 As an example, suppose Ω = {ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 , ω 4 }, and assume that Ellen has an information partition {E 1 , E 2 } with E 1 = {ω 1 , ω 3 } and E 2 = {ω 2 , ω 4 }. This indicates that, if the true state of the world is ω 2 , for example, then Ellen knows that either ω 2 or ω 4 is the true state, but she does not know which one.
Next let Frank's partition be {F 1 , F 2 }, where F 1 = {ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 } and F 2 = {ω 4 }. Assume these partitions are "common knowledge," so Ellen knows Frank's partition, Frank knows Ellen's partition, Ellen knows that Frank knows Ellen's partition, and so on. However, agents are not told the actual piece of information the other received. This sort of common knowledge assumption is standard in the literature.
Suppose the true state is ω 1 . Then Ellen knows the state is one of ω 1 or ω 3 . Thus, Ellen knows the state is in Frank's cell F 1 = {ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 }, so she knows that Frank thinks the state might be ω 2 . Also, since Frank thinks the state might be ω 2 , he incorrectly thinks that Ellen might think the state might be ω 4 . Thus, Ellen knows the state is not ω 4 , but she also knows that Frank thinks she might think the state might be ω 4 . This type of "higher order" thinking is essential for greater fool bubble models Ellen's and Frank's information partitions evolve over time as they get new information, with their underlying information partitions in period t given by E t = {E it } and F t = {F it }. These partitions incorporate any previous information that Ellen or Frank have (e.g., from Ω E , Ω F , m E 0 (ω) and m E 0 (ω)). They also become (at least weakly) more informative over time, so Ellen and Frank do not forget. Ellen and Frank can also learn from current and previous market prices. The partitions also incorporating this additional price information will be denoted by
Finally, assume that all information is revealed by period 3.
A competitive equilibrium in this market consists of a state-dependent pricing function, p t (ω), and a pair of state-dependent net sales functions, x E t (ω) and x Follow by saying that a strong bubble exists at a state, ω, if all agents know that the risky asset is overpriced for sure. Thus, if a strong bubble exists at state ω and time t, then Ellen, say, knows that the asset is overpriced, so ω ∈ E P it implies that, for all ω
. That is, if the state is ω, Ellen might (see , Morris et al., 1995 , Brunnermeier, 2001 , or Conlon, 2004 .
not know that the state is ω, but she does know which cell, E P it , ω is in, and, for every state, ω ! in E P it , the asset is overpriced. A similar condition must hold for Frank.
We next derive formulas for p t (ω), t = 1, 2, 3. For t = 3, price equals the dividend, since both agents have complete information. This means that p 3 (ω) = d(ω).
To obtain p 2 (ω), suppose a buyer, Ellen say, is considering buying one more unit of the risky asset at information set E P i2 in period 2. Since E P i2 incorporates price information, p 2 (ω) will be constant on E P i2 . Denote this constant by p 2 . Then if Ellen buys this unit, her expected utility will change by
This is the expected marginal utility, from dividends, of holding one more unit of the asset in period 3, minus the expected marginal utility cost of holding p 2 units less money, both at information set E P i2 .
Ellen buys if ∆EU E ≥ 0, but she has inÞnite demand if ∆EU E > 0. She therefore buys a positive but Þnite amount only if ∆EU E = 0. This yields
for all ω ∈ E P i2 . This is the equilibrium period 2 price if Ellen is buying, or more generally, if Ellen is not short-sale constrained. Similarly, if Ellen is not short-sale constrained in period 1 and information set E P i1 , then
Similar formulas hold if Frank is not short-sale constrained. Note that (3) and (4) are essentially conditional expectations, based on the artiÞcial probabilities M E (ω).
Finally, note that the elasticity of demand is inÞnite at the equilibrium price, so expected consumer surplus must be zero. Expected welfare therefore simply equals the appropriately weighted expected producer surplus.
GENERAL DEFLATION OF OVERPRICED ASSETS
This section presents a simple example of a bubble. It also examines a policy of "general deßation of overpriced assets," where, if any investors know an asset is overpriced, then, with probability λ, the central bank also knows this, and announces its information. This is not yet "bubble bursting," since some investors may not know the asset is overpriced. Thus, general deßation of overpriced assets can protect these uninformed investors from the informed investors, and so, tends to increase welfare.
We Þrst present the basic model and equilibrium, and then analyze policy.
2.A. Basic Setup and Equilibrium
We Þrst give some intuition for the bubble model. There are two traders, Ellen and Frank. In some states of the world Ellen is a "bad seller" who wants to sell Frank an asset she knows is worthless. In other states Ellen is a "good seller," who believes that the asset may be valuable, but is willing to sell it to Frank because he is willing to pay more for it than she is. Frank is willing to buy the asset from Ellen, even though she might be a bad seller, because there are potential gains from trade if she is good, and Frank cannot distinguish between states where Ellen is a good versus a bad seller.
Symmetrically, there are certain states in which Frank is a good or bad seller, and
Ellen is willing to buy in some of these states, since she cannot distinguish between states where Frank is good versus bad. Finally, in certain of the bad states, both know the asset is worthless, but each is willing to hold it in the (mistaken) belief that he/she will be able to sell it later. A strong bubble therefore exists in those states.
In certain of the bad states, the central bank also knows the asset is worthless.
This subsection assumes that the central bank does not reveal its information, while the next subsection assumes the central bank announces these states if they occur.
Assume that there are twelve possible states of nature,
The letter b indicates a potential bubble state, while the letters e versus f indicate whether Ellen alone or Frank alone can produce the asset in that state. Superscripts B versus G indicate whether the seller is bad (so he/she knows the asset is worthless) or good (so he/she thinks it might be valuable). Finally, the subscript CB indicates that the central bank knows the asset is worthless in that state, and the subscripts on e
and f G i affect the timing of information, as explained below. More speciÞcally, assume Ellen (Frank) can produce the asset in states ω ∈ Ω E (ω ∈ Ω F ), where
and the central bank knows whether or not the state of the world is in
Assume the asset only pays a nonzero dividend in states e G 3 and f G 3 , and this
the central bank learns that ω ∈ Ω CB and announces this, this information becomes common knowledge, and the price falls to zero. However, this subsection assumes that the central bank does not make any announcements.
For simplicity, assume symmetry in probabilities and marginal utilities. Thus, for
Similarly, for marginal utilities assume symmetries such as
, and so on. These symmetries imply the following symmetries for the shadow state prices M E and M F :
,
We next indicate what Ellen and Frank know, using their information partitions,
while Frank's underlying information partition is
These partitions are illustrated in Figure 1 .
Note that we left the time subscript t = 1 off of the information sets for simplicity.
Note also that Ellen can produce the risky asset in the cells E 
Note that we include the time subscript t = 2. Also, in the cells E Recall that the asset only pays a nonzero dividend in states e Ellen and Frank know that the asset is worthless, though neither knows that the other knows. Thus, if the price of the asset is nevertheless positive in these states, this will represent a strong bubble in the sense of .
We now construct an equilibrium with a strong bubble in states b and b CB . 
Suppose that M E and M F satisfy the three conditions
and
.
Then the prices in Table 1 form an equilibrium, where p 1 and p 2 are given as
and PROOF: See Appendix A.
Note that conditions symmetrical to (13), (14) and (15) , and so, may consider the asset to be a good hedge against his future labor income, while Ellen may consider the asset to be a bad hedge against her future labor income.
Thus, when these conditions are met, future sellers bid p 1 up to (16) in the Þrst period, and buyers bid p 2 up to (17) in the second period, and purchase at that price.
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As discussed at the end of the next subsection, there is also a second nonbubble equilibrium, with price always zero in states b, b CB , e B , e B CB , f B , and f B CB .
2.B. Policy Analysis
We now examine the welfare effects of a policy of "general deßation of overpriced assets." Recall that b CB , e Let 0 < λ < 1 be a parameter indicating the probability that the central bank knows the asset is overpriced, if at least one private agent knows this. SpeciÞcally, let
15 In terms of their roles in our discussion, (13) is not needed in richer models (see Subsection 3.A), while (14) assures that trade occurs in period 2, not period 1, and (15) generates a motive for trade in period 2. Also, to simplify the analysis, assume that the states b and b CB , etc, are identical in terms of marginal utilities, so
, and
), for k = E, F . This, combined with (18), implies that
B CB ), and
Suppose the central bank follows a policy of deßating overpriced assets, so it announces whether or not the state is one of b CB , e 
PROOF: First, equations (13) and (19) above imply that
since (19) implies that the right hand side of (13 ! ) equals the right hand side of (13). Bad sellers therefore continue to pool with good sellers. Also, the analogue of (14) continues to hold if e B CB is removed, since the right hand side becomes smaller. Similarly, the analogue of (15) continues to hold, since the left hand side becomes bigger. QED Thus, a bubble equilibrium continues to exist in the presence of a policy of general deßation of overpriced assets. This policy rule has four major effects:
(a) In those states where an overpriced asset is deßated, producers do not waste resources producing the asset. This improves welfare.
(b) Bad sellers, who know the asset is worthless, cannot sell the asset if the central bank reveals it to be worthless. This hurts bad sellers, but helps buyers.
(c) In states where the central bank does not make a price deßating announcement, buyers become more conÞdent that the asset is valuable, so they bid up p 2 , so p 1 also rises. This helps sellers but hurts buyers. Effects (b) and (c) are pure "transfer effects," while (a) and (d) inßuence production. For buyers, these effects must perfectly cancel, since their demand is inÞnitely elastic, so their expected consumer surplus remains constant at zero. For sellers, these effects may not cancel. The lower probability of selling worthless assets (effect (b)) hurts sellers, but the higher price (effect (c)) helps them. Thus, seller welfare could rise or fall. However, suppose transfer effects (b) and (c) exactly cancel. Then we will
show that the improved allocation of production (less output in bad-seller states, from effect (a), more output in remaining states, from effect (d)) helps welfare.
Thus, consider Ellen's expected utility. Since her elasticity of demand is inÞnite in all states where she buys, her expected consumer surplus is zero in those states, whether the policy is in effect or not. Thus, her expected beneÞt from this market comes from proÞts in states where she produces. Since, by (16), she is indifferent between selling her output in period 1 and holding it for period 2, we can imagine, when calculating her expected utility, that she sells her output in period 1. Also, her proÞt from states where she produces is p 1 a
We must compare her expected welfare with no deßation policy (NDP ) to that with deßation policy (DP ). Denote the value of p 1 in these two cases as p NDP 1 and p DP 1 , respectively. Then using (16), (17) and (17 ! ),
. This yields effect (c) above.
In the no-deßation-policy case, Ellen produces in states b, b CB , e B , e
and e G 3 , so her expected welfare from this market is
On the other hand, in the deßation-policy case, she produces only in states b, e B , e 
To isolate transfer effects (b) and (c), consider Þrst the case of a Þxed endowment e, so Π(p 1 ) = ep 1 . Proposition 3 determines the welfare effect of policy in this case. Finally, conditions (13) through (15) in Proposition 1 do not force inequality (23) to go either way, since they say nothing about how much weight Ellen puts on her good
states, e Next take as a baseline the case where shadow state prices are chosen to eliminate transfer effects, so policy has no effect on expected welfare under Þxed endowments. This is analogous to the standard practice of ignoring pure lump sum transfers in consumer/producer surplus analysis. In this case, (21) equals (22) for Π(p 1 ) = ep 1 , so
Suppose (24) (24) holds, so there is no transfer effect, then the only remaining welfare consequence of the price-deßation policy is better production decisions. This improvement has two aspects. First, since the central bank sometimes reveals when the asset is worthless, bad sellers waste less resources producing worthless assets (effect (a)).
Second, in those states where the central bank makes no announcement, the lemons problem is reduced, so producers can produce more conÞdently (effect (d)).
Up to now, we have focused on the case where the policy rule shifts the economy from one bubble equilibrium to another. However, a nonbubble equilibrium also continues to exist in the presence of the policy, with price equal to zero in states b, b CB , e B , e B CB , f B , and f B CB . While we cannot determine which equilibrium will prevail, the above framework allows us to analyze the effect of the policy in each case, regardless of whether the policy shifts the market into or out of a bubble equilibrium. This is because a nonbubble equilibrium is identical to the equilibrium in Proposition 2, but with λ = 1 (so the central bank always deßates an asset someone knows is overpriced).
For example, if the policy shifts the market from a bubble to a nonbubble equilibrium, the effect is as in Propositions 2 through 4, but with λ = 1, so the effect is stronger.
If the policy shifts the market from a nonbubble to a bubble equilibrium, the effect is reversed -like reducing λ from λ 0 = 1 to some λ 1 < 1, and so on.
Of course, the fact that policy may shift the economy between bubble and nonbubble equilibria is important, since it may help to explain why policy sometimes has such unpredictable effects on asset markets.
In any case, unless a policy of general deßation of overpriced assets causes the economy to shift from a nonbubble to a bubble equilibrium, it improves production allocation decisions. This policy will therefore be beneÞcial overall unless the transfer effect is negative. By contrast, a bubble bursting policy is likely to worsen production allocation decisions, as shown next.
BURSTING BUBBLES AND THE LEMONS PROBLEM

3.A. Comment on Robustness
The above equilibria were not robust since they required the coincidence (13).
However, this is not an inescapable problem in this kind of bubble model. Instead, it is simply the price we pay for the convenience of a Þnite state space.
The coincidence in (13) It then turns out that, in states where the central bank does not actually make an announcement, the presence of a bubble bursting policy rule increases the conÞdence of bad sellers. We therefore choose parameters such that bad sellers pool with lowconÞdence good sellers in the absence of the policy, but with high-conÞdence good sellers if the policy rule is in place.
3.B. Basic Setup and Equilibrium
The previous section examined a policy where the central bank deßates asset prices when some agents know the asset is worthless, even if others do not. However, central banks may know less about fundamentals than all private agents in the economy. For example, the central bank may only learn that an asset is overpriced in states where all other agents already know this, so the asset is in an strong bubble.
The policy then becomes one of bursting bubbles. This section shows that such a policy protects bad sellers from each other, so they can more conÞdently exploit buyers.
For consider a bad seller who knows the asset is worthless. She also knows that, if the asset is in a bubble, then the central bank might announce this. Thus, if the central bank makes no announcement, she becomes more conÞdent that she is not in a bubble.
That is, she becomes more conÞdent that some other agent does not know the asset is worthless, so she can sell him the asset. She therefore more closely mimics those among the good sellers who are conÞdent that the asset is valuable. This exacerbates the lemons problem faced by the more conÞdent of the good sellers, which distorts production decisions. In short, while general deßation of overpriced assets tends to improve production decisions, a bubble bursting policy may hurt production decisions.
This analysis requires a modiÞcation of the above bubble model. As explained in the previous subsection, we need to posit two different types of good seller, with two different conÞdence levels. Bad sellers can then pool with low-conÞdence good sellers if there is no bubble-bursting policy, and pool with high-conÞdence good sellers if there is a bubble bursting policy. If bad sellers could not pool with good sellers, asset prices would collapse, and there would be no bubble.
Let the two conÞdence levels for the good types of seller be L, for low conÞdence, and H, for high conÞdence, and let the states of the world be
The asset pays dividend announcements again occur before production, so central bank announcements, or lack thereof, can inßuence agents' production decisions.
Suppose that, in the Þrst period, and prior to the central bank announcement, Ellen has four information sets:
and symmetrically for Frank. Here E B Seller is Ellen's "bad seller" information set, E
LG Seller her "low-conÞdence good seller" information set, E
HG
Seller her "high-conÞdence good seller" information set, and E Buyer her "buyer" information set. In period 2,
, and f G 1H are revealed to all players. In period 3, all information is revealed and any dividends are paid.
Below, "high conÞdence" will mean that
This means that, in the Þrst period, high-conÞdence good sellers attach greater weight to states with positive second period price than do low-conÞdence good sellers.
As in Section 2, assume symmetry between Ellen and Frank, so
, and, for i = 1, 2, 3,
. We can therefore focus on the states where Ellen can produce and sell:
We want the model to have nice equilibria whether or not the central bank announces b CB . SpeciÞcally, we want a bubble equilibrium to exist where bad sellers pool with some type of good seller, whether or not a bubble-bursting policy rule is in effect.
The equilibrium structure that works is presented in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 presents the structure of equilibrium prices without a bubble bursting policy (NP ), and Table   3 presents the structure with a bubble bursting policy (BP ). 
Note that the main difference between Tables 2 and 3 
with I = L, H, and
with I = L, H. Then, if the central bank does not follow a bubble-bursting policy, an equilibrium exists with prices as in Table 2 , where
and p 
, (17 BP ) and where again we assume that (16 ! ) and (17 BP ) yield p
Finally, Ellen produces a Frank, where p 1 (ω) is given in Table 2 in the no bubble bursting case, and with the good seller. Of course, it follows from this that the buyer is even more willing to buy from the good seller when he is sure that the seller is not bad.
3.C. Welfare Analysis: Bursting of Actual Bubbles
To examine the welfare effects of policy, remember that, since the elasticity of demand is inÞnite, consumer surplus is zero, so welfare from the market equals expected producer surplus. Also, as before, sellers are indifferent between selling in periods 1 or 2, so for the purpose of calculating expected welfare, we can imagine that they sell in period 1. Thus, in the absence of a bubble-bursting policy, Ellen's ex ante expected welfare, averaging over all her information sets, is
Similarly, if the central bank follows a bubble-bursting rule, Ellen's welfare will be
These are ex ante expected utilities, from Ellen's point of view, before she knows her own type, etc. We can break this up into contributions to expected utility through her bad seller type, her low-conÞdence good seller type, and her high-conÞdence good seller type. Proposition 6 treats the welfare contribution through her bad seller type, while Propositions 7 and 8 treat the contributions through her two good seller types.
PROPOSITION 6: In the Þxed endowment case, the bubble bursting policy will have no effect on the expected welfare of bad sellers if and only if policy does not affect the actual second period sales price received by bad sellers, so p
. In this case, the bubble bursting policy helps bad sellers when production is possible.
PROOF: See Appendix C.
Thus, if the transfer effect alone does not hurt bad sellers, then a bubble-bursting policy helps them. This is because the central bank bursts bubbles in states where bad sellers would not be able to sell anyway. The policy therefore does not affect the ex ante probability that bad sellers actually sell their assets. It only gives them some information, before production, about whether they will be able to sell the asset. Thus, if the policy does not affect the actual sale price, its only effect is to allow bad sellers to make better informed production decisions.
We now turn to the effect on high and low-conÞdence types of good seller. Since the bubble bursting policy causes bad types of seller to pool with high, rather than low-conÞdence types of good seller, bubble bursting helps low-conÞdence good sellers, but hurts high-conÞdence good sellers, as shown in the following Proposition: and use (16 ! )). QED Proposition 7 raises the question of which of the two effects -higher welfare for low-conÞdence good sellers, or lower welfare for high-conÞdence good sellers -dominates. Of course, if agents put much more weight on their high-conÞdence types
, then a bubble-bursting policy will hurt good sellers on average, and visa versa. The transfer effect is therefore straightforward.
To focus on production distortions, we choose weights so that the transfer effects on high and low-conÞdence good sellers perfectly cancel in the Þxed endowment case.
When we do this, we Þnd that the negative production effects for high-conÞdence good sellers tend to dominate when production is possible.
PROPOSITION 8: Suppose the shadow prices, M E (ω) and M F (ω), are such that, in the Þxed endowment case, overall expected welfare of good sellers is unaffected by a bubble bursting policy. Suppose also that the greater conÞdence of the highconÞdence good sellers is sufficient so that
Then, in the production case, the negative effect of the bubble bursting policy on highconÞdence types dominates the positive effect of the policy on low-conÞdence types, so the overall expected effect of the bubble bursting policy on good sellers is negative.
The Þrst half of (30) compares p 1 for high-conÞdence good sellers to p 1 for lowconÞdence good sellers, given that, in both cases, the bad seller is pooling with the good seller. Similarly, the second half of (30) compares p 1 for high-conÞdence versus low-conÞdence good sellers, given that the bad seller is not pooling with the good seller. Thus, both halves state that, holding all else equal in the appropriate sense, high-conÞdence good sellers bid p 1 up higher than low-conÞdence good sellers, which makes sense.
Combining Propositions 6 and 8, a bubble bursting policy tends to improve production decisions for bad sellers, but distort production decisions for good sellers, by shifting the lemons problem from low to high-conÞdence good sellers. Intuitively, a bubble is a situation where bad sellers are hurting other bad sellers, and this interferes with their ability to exploit buyers. Thus, a bubble bursting policy, by protecting bad sellers from each other, allows them to more conÞdently exploit buyers. This exacerbates the lemons problem faced by the more conÞdent of the good sellers. While the overall effect is ambiguous, one can question the value of a policy whose main beneÞt is to help bad sellers to more efficiently exploit uninformed buyers.
In summary, bubbles tend to exist in environments of asymmetric information.
This asymmetric information hurts welfare by creating a lemons problem. However, the most extreme symptom of this asymmetric information -the bubble -does not, itself, necessarily hurt welfare. Thus, curing the symptom may make the underlying problem worse.
WELFARE WITH IRRATIONAL INVESTORS
The above assumed that all agents were rational. However, the analysis can easily be extended to certain types of irrationality. In particular, while trade in the above model was induced by a hedging motive, it may be more plausible to assume that trade is driven by overconÞdence, as in Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) . In this case, the shadow prices M E (ω) and M F (ω) may differ, not because marginal utilities differ, but because probabilities differ, as in and Conlon (2004 to that agent's own possibly mistaken model (see, e.g., Diamond, 1967, p. 762 ).
The present paper is more in line with this second approach. Indeed, if shadow prices differ because probability beliefs differ, then Pareto improvements in the present framework become Pareto improvements with each agent's welfare evaluated using that agent's own probabilities, rather than any true probabilities. If policy is evaluated from this point of view, then all the above results go through exactly as before.
Of course, if one prefers to measure welfare according to the policy maker's probabilities, then there might be a stronger argument for protecting buyers from bad sellers.
On the other hand, if investors are overconÞdent, then lemons problems may be a good thing, since they may make buyers less conÞdent, and so, may reduce mispricing caused by overconÞdence. In any case, one cannot understand the effects of asset deßation policies without tracing the effects of these policies on the lemons problem.
In addition, even if one models overconÞdent or otherwise irrational agents, there is nevertheless a role for asymmetric information in bubble models. Even overconÞ-dent agents may realize that they have something to learn from the opinions of other investors, and this type of information leakage between investors may play a crucial role in market booms and crashes (Doblas-Madrid, 2008, Kai and Conlon, 2008) .
CONCLUSION AND POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS
This paper analyzes bubble-bursting policy in the context of an greater fool bubble model. This allows us to study greater fool bubbles in a framework with rational agents, which, in turn, allows us to separate the role of policy as responding to distorted incentives from the role of policy as protecting agents from their own irrationality. Of course, the case of agent irrationality is also important.
The main lesson of this study is that, while asymmetric information is bad (since it creates a lemons problem), and asymmetric information tends to create bubbles, bubbles themselves are not necessarily bad. Thus, a policy which reduces the adverse effects of asymmetric information on uninformed buyers, such as general deßation of overpriced assets, may be a good thing, but a policy which protects bad sellers from each other, such as the bursting of actual bubbles, may be harmful.
Since this paper provides only a Þrst look at policy in asymmetric information bubble models, it is obviously incomplete in important ways. One obvious extension
is to consider what happens if the central bank mistakenly tries to deßate the price of an asset which is not, in fact, overpriced. The effect of the policy then clearly depends on how much investors trust the central bank's judgment (Kai and Conlon, 2008) .
Second, it would be useful to incorporate a richer model of the monetary policy instrument, speciÞcally, effects through open market operations. Of course, given the importance of asymmetric information in the present framework, information will be an important part of any transmission mechanism. For example, an interest rate hike may be necessary to credibly signal the Fed's skepticism to the market.
A third extension would be to examine a model with more periods. This would allow us to analyze delayed policy, and the effects of expected future announcements on current resource allocation. For example, in the above framework, any bubbles already exist in the Þrst period, and the central bank either does or does not deßate overpriced assets right away. In contrast, one could imagine a model where, as prices gradually rise, more and more investors come to realize that the asset is overpriced, as in Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) . In this case, early action by the central bank would deßate prices before all agents knew they were overpriced, as in general deßation of overpriced assets, while delayed action would mean the bursting of an actual strong bubble. It would be interesting to see how the above conclusions change when carried over to this more complicated environment.
Finally, future work should vary the information structure, and also modify the assumption that the elasticity of demand for the asset is inÞnite. In addition, the potential consequences of investor risk aversion should be examined more seriously. Thus, in both periods 1 and 2, the price is bid up to the highest willingness to pay, and the other side is either indifferent to trade or short-sale constrained at the equilibrium trade. Also, each period's price is constant on that period's information sets, so the price reveals no new information. .
Finally, the left hand side of (B1) equals the left hand side of (23) 
In 
Here the Þrst step follows from the deÞnition of δ L and the second step follows from (D1). The third step follows since p NP 1H − p BP 1H > 0 (by Proposition 7) and δ L < δ H , and the fourth step uses the deÞnition of δ H . Inequality (D3) then shows that
so the bubble bursting policy reduces the overall expected welfare of the good sellers in the production case. QED
